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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GIBBOXS & REED
Corporation,

CO~IP ANY,

a

Plaintiff,
-YS.-

S. Y. Gl'THRIE, ADAThi K. GRAFE
and ROBERT I. LUDWIG,
Defendants.

)

Case No.
7850

Brief of Appellants
STATEMENT
This is an action brought by Gibbons & Reed Company, a Utah Corporation, against S. Y. Guthrie, Adam
K. Grafe and Robert I. Ludwig, to recover the sum of
$15,356.75 with interest from April 2, 1951.
The action was dismissed against the defendant,
Robert I. Ludwig, and by order of Court, Thomas J.
Bates & Sons were made parties to the suit. No service
was made upon Thomas J. Bates & Sons, or either of
them, and the judgment was entered against only the
appellants S. Y. Guthrie and Adam K. Grafe.
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The action is founded upon an alleged oral agreement between the parties but the facts, as shown by the
evidence, is that the action arises out of a written proposal made by the plaintiff to the defendants ( appellants) S. Y. Guthrie and Adam K. Grafe, to perform
rertain exploratory and development work on some
uranium mining claims, situate in the Henry Mountain
Mining District, Garfield County, Utah, held by appellants, under certain written agreements with one L. R.
Weeks, Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A", Defendants' Exhibit
"9". {Tr. 21)
Said proposal was prepared after plaintiff had
examined the premises and pursuant thereto plaintiff
moved certain heavy duty equipment upon the ground
{Tr. 24) employed one Harold Ekker to be general foreman or superintendent and authorized him to hire the
necessary labor to carry out said proposal. (Tr. 20)
Harold Ekker actually began his employment with
Plaintiffs on or about February 9th (Tr. 202). At that
time he discussed with George M. Jones, plaintiffs' agent
the nature of his job and also on that occasion discussed
the matter of the kind of equipment that would be necessary and told Mr. Jones it would take very good equipment in that out of the way area. Jones said they would
send good equipment.
Notwithstanding plaintiff had examined the premises
upon which said work was to be performed and well knew
that heavy duty equipment in good repair would be required, plaintiff sent equipment to the job in bad state
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of repair and failed to supply the necessary parts and
facilities for putting said equipment in workable condition. Failure to properly repair and maintain said
equipment caused repeated breakdowns with consequent
frequent suspension of operations. (Tr. pages 203 to
210 inc.)
The unusable condition of the equipment was
brought to the attention of Pat Gibbons, one of the
owners of plaintiff's company on or about March 1st,
1951, who assured appellant Grafe the equipment would
be remedied and the work proceed. (Tr. 224-225)
Gibbons failed to have the equipment repaired and
on ~larch 12th appellant Guthrie went down to the properties at Hanksville and found the tractor (Cat) broken
down. The necessary parts for repair of the equipment
were not on hand and thereupon Guthrie requested the
Cat operator, Vearl Boyer, to go to Salt Lake City and
have Robert I. Ludwig notify plaintiff to come get its
equipment off the premises, that appellants would take
over the operations. ( Tr. 224-230)
Respondents' proposal Exhibit ''A'' provides inter
alia "The number of days the operation is continued is,
of course, your option''. The estimated performance for
the three operations is: (1) Four 20ft. deep holes drilled
and checked per day. (2) Four 6 ft. deep holes stripped
per day, and (3) one ton of material drilled, shot and
moved per man per day.
When respondents prepared and submitted said proposal set forth above they were aware that appellants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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were depending on the faithful performance of the operations outlined in order that appellants could determine
whether they would exercise a certain option with L. R.
Weeks on April 15th obligating appellants to take possession of said mining claims and operate same or pay
L. R. Weeks $1,000 per month for a period of one year
(Tr. 42).
Notwithstanding this knowledge of the urgency and
importance of diligent and continuous work upon said
mining properties respondents' own diary of performance Exhibit "F" shows a woeful disregard of the
confidence placed in respondent by the appellants. This
attitude is corroborated by the uncontradicted testimony
of appellant Grafe on the occasion of his visit to the
property when he found the equipment broken down
and the chief Cat operator Boyer refused to continue
operations with such equipment. (Tr. 126-127)
Coming now to a comparison of what respondent
accomplished and what the proposal Exhibit "A" required respondent to do-attention is directed to appellants' Exhibits "1". The general summary and summary of work performed, prepared by Robert Deming,
respondents' field supervisor. The data shown on these
Exhibits is not contradicted by respondent-whereas,
the proposal called for four 20 ft. deep holes drilled and
checked per day, four 6 ft. deep holes stripped per day
and one ton of material drilled, shot and moved per man
per day, the evidence shows that in 225 man-days, Feb.
9th to March 18th, Appellants' Ex. "11 ", respondent
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drilled a total of eleYen holes with an aggregate of 250
feet drilled. For this performance the respondent billed
appellant $1~.~i36. I 3, but \Yhen payment was refused,
filed suit for $13,33().13. The Court gave judgment for
the amount billed, to-wit, $1~J~36.73 \Yith interest. Nowhere in the Findings of Fact is there any statement of
how the Court arrived at the amount of the judgment.
Respondent placed in eYidence Exhibit '' B '' in support of its claim over the objection of the appellants,
but failed to substantiate most of the items contained
in the Exhibit by actual delivery of performance. See
Robert Deming Deposition, admitted in evidence but
not identified by Exhibit designation. Pages 43, 51, 61,
69, 70.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Appellants rely upon the following points:
Point No. 1.
The Court erred in making and entering Conclusion
of Law No. 2 to the effect that:
The defendants, in breach of said agreement have
never paid plaintiff for the expenses incurred under the
terms of said agreement and that by reason thereof,
plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of Twelve Thousand Three Hundred Fifty-six Dollars and Seventy-five
Cents ($12,356.75) plus interest at six per cent (6%)
from the termination date of said contract (March 18,
1951).
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Point No.2.
The Court erred in entering in its Findings that
the plaintiff was to build certain roads and trails on the
property in question as set forth in No. 2, and the Court
further erred in its Findings in No. 2 wherein the Court
found that the plaintiff performed the preliminary and
exploratory mining work with reference to the said
uranium claims held by the defendants in said area in
the Henry Mountains, Garfield County, Utah.
Point No.3.
The Court erred in entering in its Findings as set
forth in No. 5 that as a further condition of said agreement, the plaintiff placed on its payroll, at the request
of the defendants, the necessary workmen to conduct the
preliminary and exploratory mining work, all of which
was done in accordance with said agreement.
Point No.4.
The Court erred in entering in its Findings in No.6
that the defendants in breach of said agreement refused
to pay the plaintiff for the work performed.
Point No.5.
The Court erred in entering in its Findings in No.6
that the plaintiff from the commencement of performance of said agreement to the termination thereof had
performed bona fidedly and in reasonable and complete
conformance with the terms of the said agreement.
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Point No.6.
The court erred in not entering in its Findings, Conclusions and Judgment to the effect that respondent
failed, neglected and refused to perform and conform
to the terms and conditions of the respondent's proposal (Exhibit "A") and that respondent's conduct of
its operations under its said proposal Exhibit "A" was
so inefficient and ineffectiYe by reason of worn and
broken equipment and poor management that appellants
were obliged to terminate said agreement and take over
the operations themselves.
Point No.7.
The Court erred in admitting in evidence over the
objections of the appellants Exhibits "B" and "C", the
Operating Ledger and Payroll Journal, respectively, of
the respondent.
Point No.8.
The Court erred in making and entering its judgment herein, and the whole thereof, to the effect that:
1. That the plaintiff be awarded a judgment in the
amount of $12,356.75 with interest thereon at the rate
of six per cent (6%) from March 18, 1951.
Point No.9.
The Court erred in making and entering Conclusion
of Law No. 3 to the effect that:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The defendants are not entitled to any relief on
their counterclaims, and that the same should be dismissed with prejudice.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO.1.
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 2 TO THE EFFECT
THAT:
THE DEFENDANTS IN BREACH OF SAID
AGREEMENT HAVE NEVER PAID PLAINTIFF
FOR THE EXPENSES INCURRED UNDER THE
TERMS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND THAT BY
REASON THEREOF, PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN DAMAGED IN THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX DOLLARS AND
SEVENTY-FIVE CENTS ($12,356.75) PLUS INTEREST AT SIX PERCENT (6%) FROM THE TERMINATION DATE OF SAID CONTRACT (MARCH
18th, 1951).
It is the position of the appellants that the general
rule is that the parties to a contract are bound to perform
it according to its terms where they are sui juris, the
contract violtaes no rule of law or public policy and no
fraud or imposition has been practiced, particularly
when it has been executed by the other party, although
it may be difficult to determine the rights of the parties
on a breach, or although the contract operates partially
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or unjustly on one of the partil)s or entails a loss on him.
C. J. 8., Yoll7, Page 930, St=>e. -!31.

EXCUSES FOR XONPERFORMANCE
The general rule is that, where a person by
his contract eharges himself with an obligation
possible to be performed, he must perform it,
unless its performance is rendered impossible by
the act of God, see infra Sec. 463, by the law, see
infra Sec. 467, or by the other party, see infra Sec.
-!()8, it being the rule that in case the party desires
to be excused from performance in the event of
contingencies arising, it is his duty to provide
therefor in his contract. Hence, performance is
not excused by subsequent inability to perform,
by unforeseen difficulties, by unusual or unexpected expense, by danger, by inevitable accident,
by the breaking of machinery, by strikes, by sick-ness, by failure of a party to avail himself of the
benefits to be had under the contract, by weather
conditions, by financial stringency, or by stagnation of business. Neither is performance excused
by the fact that the contract turns out to be hard
and improvident, unprofitable or impracticable,
ill advised, or even foolish, or less profitable, or
unexpectedly burdensome. Likewise, the party
from whom the performance is due cannot assert
that performance would be of no benefit to the
other party.
Page 946, C. J. S., Sec. 459.
It is the contention of the appellants that the evidence in this case clearly brings the respondent within
the impact of the foregoing rule for there was no performance of respondents' proposal upon which the Court
could make conclusion of law No. 2 and certainly no
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performance upon which the Court could properly enter
conclusion of law No. 2 to the effect that the defendants
(appellants) in breach of said agreement have damaged
the plaintiff (respondent) in the sum of $12,356.75.
A cursory examination of the evidence reveals that
the proposal of the respondent to give it its most favorable light was to say the least very superficially performed. This is clearly emphasized in the diary kept by
Robert Deming, respondent's Field Supervisor and timekeeper, which was introduced in evidence and is a part
of the record under Exhibit ____ (not designated). Also see
the testimony of appellant Adam Grafe (Tr. Pages 169
to 172, inc.).
Where one of the parties to a contract does not perform within the time specified and his performance within
such time is essential, the other party is not obligated to
perform his original promise and there is no right of
action against such other party upon the contract, although he may be liable upon an implied promise. 12
American Juris prudence, Page 912, Sec. 349.
The only theory upon which the trial Court could
enter a judgment for the exact amount of the claim
which was originally submitted by Gibbons & Reed Company to Guthrie and Grafe was full and good faith performance of the terms and conditions of the proposal.
Exhibit "A" $12,356.75 was the amount of the claim
presented to Guthrie and Grafe after they had exercised
their option to terminate the Company's operations at
the mines.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

The proposal was t>xeeuted February 8, 1951. It
was the first week in :March before any exploration or
deYelopment work was under \Yay. The deadline at which
the performance of the proposal could be of any benefit
to the appellants was April 13th when appellants had to
exercise or not their option with L. R. Weeks (Tr. 42).
Almost 30 days had elapsed between February 15th and
:Jiarch 12th, the date when Guthrie and Grafe gave notice
of termination of the contract. :Measured in terms of
tons of earth removed and footage of holes drilled by
:Jiarch 12th not over 10% performance of the proposal
(Exhibit "A") had been accomplished yet almost 50%
of the estimated cost of the 60 day operation had assertedly been expended and claim for payment submitted.
It is manifest from the trial Court's findings, Conclusions and the Judgment rendered thereon that the Court
would hold the appellants liable to respondent to the
full extent of the estimated cost, as submitted in Exhibit
"A", regardless of how much of the respondents proposal was left undone at the end of the 60 day period.
In other words the appellants as one of the parties
to the contract are held and firmly bound to pay but
there is no corresponding duty upon the respondent to
perform in conformance with its proposal (Exhibit
"A"). We have yet to find a single authority which
supports the trial Court's concept of the evidence in
this case or the construction given the liabilities of the
parties under the contract.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellants submit the following authorities which
without exception, emphasize the necessity of performance in contracts such as the one involved in this case.

NECESSITY OF PERFORMANCE
(Ore. 1920) Though a party cannot rescind a contract and thereafter recover damages for its breach, he
can elect to treat a breach by the opposite party as terminating the contract, and thereafter recover the loss
he sustained by reason of the other party's failure to
perform his agreement. (Taylor v. Tripp, 191 P. 1054,
97 Ore. 611.)
(Utah, 1919) Where a contract is entire, and remains
executory in whole or in part, and one party commits a
breach of his duty, and the other is not in default, the
latter may rescind and be relieved from further performance. (Pool v. Motter, 185 P. 714, 55 Utah, :l88.)
(Cal. 1884) Where the performance of an executory
contract by one party depends upon something to be
previously done by the other, an action will not lie for
nonperformance if default has been made in the accomplishment of the preceding act. (Peasley v. Hart, 4 P. 537,
65 Cal. 522.)
(Cal. 1905) Civ. Code Sec. 1439 declares that before
any party to an obligation can require another party to
perform he must fulfill the conditions precedent imposed
on himself. Plaintiff and others agree to subscribe
various sums to a fund to secure a lease and in prosSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pecting certain land supposed to contain mineral; it
being agreed that each subscriber should own an interest
proportionate to his subscription. Thereafter the owner
of the land granted to plaintiff and the others the right
to enter on the land to prospect and mine for a certain
term, the owner to receive a royalty, or the lessees were
entitled to pay a sum in cash as full consideration for
their rights. Plaintiff failed to make any of his payments, and after the discovery of mineral by the others
he sued for a decree declaring him to be the owner of an
interest. Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to recover,
he having forfeited his rights, it being immaterial
whether the agreement executed by the owner was a lease
or a mere mining privilege, and the statute of frauds
having nothing to do with the case. (Cameron v. Burnham, 80 P. 929, 146 Cal. 580.)
(Kan.
the terms
machinery
the mill of

1897) A. enters into a contract with B., by
of which A. agrees to furnish some new
and put it with the old machinery already in
B., and is to remodel said mill, and agrees to

change it so it will do certain things, and B. agrees to
accept and settle for it when the mill fulfils the agreement of A. Held, that B. is not bound to accept and settle
for it, and is not in default in the payments contracted
for, until it fulfils the agreement. (1896) (Richardson
v. Great Western Mfg. Co., 43 P. 809, 3 Kan. App. 445,
judgment reversed Great Western Mfg. Co. v. Richardson, 47 P. 537, 57 Kan. 661.)
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In the obligation assumed by a party to a contract
is found his duty, and his failure to comply with the
duty constitutes the breach.
Defendant was liable for breach of contract to irrigate, care for, and cultivate young pecan sprouts and
trees, since such negligence was not failure to do things
growing out of fiduciary relation of joint adventurers,
but failure to do specific acts defendant had agreed and
bound himself to do by written contract. (Lorden v.
Snell, 39 Arizona 128, 4 Pac. 2d 392.)
If a contract provides for a series of acts and actual
default is made in the performance of one of them,
accompanied by a refusal to perform the rest, the other
party need not perform, but may treat the refusal as a
breach of the entire contract and may recover accordingly. It can make no difference whether a contract is
partially performed. (Mobley v. New York L. Ins. Co.,
295 U. S. 632, 79 L. Ed. 1621, 55 S. Ct. 876, 99 A. L. R.
1166; Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 44 L. Ed. 953, 20 S. Ct.
780; United Press As so. v. National Newspaper Asso.
(C. C. A. 8th) 237 F. 547, citing R. C. L.) (Lake Shore
& M. S. R. Co. v. Richards, 152 Ill. 59, 38 N. E. 773, 30
L. R. A. 33.)
A working contract is, in the words of Corpus Juris,
''one under which work or labor is to be performed in
the erection, construction or repairs of some building,
edifice, structure, or other work".
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The contract is to govern their respective rights,
duties and liabilities, and by it these rights must be
determined. (17 C. J. S. 333, Sec. 11). Utah Lumber
Ys. James, 71 Par. 986, 25 Ut. 434.
Contract consisted in part of certain specifications,
working plans, and detail drawings.
All material was to be thoroughly kiln-dried, handsmoothed and scraped. Was not a mere sale on inspection, was a building contract, obligating the dealer to
furnish and deliver the material according to such plans
and specifications.
Obligation to perform in general.
Sec. 451.)

(C. J. S. 930,

Performance of a contract has been defined to be
such a fulfillment of its duties as puts an end to its obligation by leaving nothing more to be done. (C. J. S.
999, Sec. 494.) (McGuire vs. J. Neils Lumber Co., 107
N. W. 130, 97 Minn. 293.)
Performance of an obligation under a contract consists of the doing of the required act at the time and
place and in the manner stipulated by the terms of the
contract. (N. Estrada, Inc. vs. Terry Texas Civ. app.
293 s. w. 286.)
To breach a contract implies a violation of a valid
and subsisting obligation. (Russel vs. Stephens, Wash.
71 Pac. 2d 30.)
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Anything so material and important as to defeat the
purpose of the parties is breach of contract. (J. A. D.
Andrea, Inc. vs. Dodge, C. C. A. Pa. 15, Fed. 2d 1003reversing D. ( ~- Dodge vs. A. D. Andrea, Inc., 10 Fed.
2d 387.)
A party is guilty of the first breach who first fails
to do what he is contractually bound to do. (C. J. S. 999,
Sec. 494~)
Contracts for the performance of ·services require
the exercise of good faith and integrity, and such special
skill as the promisor has contracted to render. The
promisor must be reasonably competent and reasonably
diligent, but he is not liable for mere mistakes or errors
causing incidental losses.
vVhere there is not a compliance as a general rule,
acceptance by the owner cannot be compelled, and the
builder is not entitled to recover on the contract, at
least not unless there is substantial compliance, or in
other words, he cannot recover where, without the consent of the owner, and to his detriment, he has substantially varied from the terms of the contract, unless there
Is legal excuse therefor. (Sec. 494, Page 1002.)
A builder must perform his contract according to
the terms of the plans and specifications, where there are
any. Ordinarily, where a contract specifically states the
method of construction, type, quality and strength of
materials, and goes into detail as to what is to be done
and the manner of doing it, the owner is bound by whatSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ever result is obtained, provided the specifications are
followed. (La. Delaune vs. Granbino App., 161 So. 331
Pa.; Tate-Jones & Co. v. Union Electric. Steel Co., 126
.A. 813, 281 Pa. 448.)
If, however, the contract states the results to be
obtained, the details and methods of construction being
left to the builder's discretion, the builder is bound to
produce the desired results.
POINT NO.2.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING IN ITS
FINDINGS THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS TO
BUILD CERTAIN ROADS AND TRAILS ON THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION AS SET FORTH IN
NO. 2, AND THE COURT FURTHER ERRED IN ITS
FINDINGS IN NO. 2 WHEREIN THE COURT
FOUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF PERFORMED
THE PRELIMINARY AND EXPLORATORY MINING WORK WITH REFERENCE TO THE SAID
URANIUM CLAIMS HELD BY THE DEFENDANTS
IN SAID AREA IN THE HENRY MOUNTAINS,
GARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH.
Appellants need only to refer to the language of
Plaintiff's proposal in sustaining Point No. 2, for nowhere in said proposal is there a single word, phrase or
clause relating to any construction of roads and trails
on the property in question. Neither is there a word of
testimony in the record to substantiate the finding that
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plaintiff performed the preliminary and exploratory
work with reference to said claims.

POINT NO.3.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING IN ITS
FINDINGS AS SET FORTH IN NO. 5 THAT AS A
FURTHER CONDITION OF SAID AGREEMENT,
rrHE PLAINTIFF PLACED ON ITS PAYROLL, AT
THE REQUEST OF THE DEFENDANTS, THE
NECESSARY WORKMEN TO CONDUCT THE PRELIMINARY AND EXPLORATORY MINING WORK,
ALL OF WHICH WAS DONE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SAID AGREEMENT.
Appellants challenge respondent to find a single
word, phrase or clause in the agreement of the parties
"Exhibit A" which even hints that appellants requested
respondent to place anyone on respondent's payrollthe evidence shows that appellants recommended certain
persons to respondent as capable workmen but neither
the written proposal nor any substantial evidence supports this finding.

POINT NO.4.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING IN ITS
FINDINGS IN NO. 6, THAT THE DEFENDANTS IN
BREACH OF SAID AGREEMENT REFUSED TO
PAY THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE WORK PERFORMED.
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The evidence shows the plaintiff has not been paid
for any of the work performed but nowhere is there
any evidence in the record substantiating the claim of
Twelve Thousand Three Hundred Fifty-six Dollars and
Sen~nty-fiye Cents ($12,356.75) which plaintiff presented
to defendants on the assumption that plaintiff had fully
performed all the obligations of its contract to the date
of termination, to-wit, :March 18, 1951.
Defendants (Appellants) could not be guilty of
breach where plaintiff (respondent) was guilty of the
first breach.
The proposal (Ex. A) on its face shows performance was to be completed within sixty days ( 60) or by
April 15th, 1951. Thirty ( 30) days had expired of the
60 day period when appellants discovered such superficial
performance of the proposal had been done as to wholly
satisfy the defendants (appellants) satisfactory performance would not be accomplished in the remaining
30 days, hence defendants (appellants) terminated the
contract as provided in the contract itself.
EFFECT OF FIRST BREACH.-It has been said
that a party first guilty of a breach of contract cannot
complain if the other party thereafter refuses to perform. Similarly, it has been said that the party who
commits the first breach of a contract cannot maintain
an action against the other for a subsequent failure to
perform. (Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co. (C. C. A. 6th), 121 F. 298, 61 L.R.A. 402.) (One
who first wrongfully violates a contract has no standing
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in court to recover for a violation of the contract by
the other party thereto (Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v.
Searles, 85 Miss. 520, 37 So. 939, 68 L.R.A. 715) ). It
It has also been said that where a contract is not performed the party who is guilty of the first breach is generally the one upon whom rests all the liability for the
nonperformance. (Anvil Min. Co. v. Humble, 153 U. S.
G40, 38 L. Ed. 814, 14 S. Ct. 876.) It seems clear that
the party first committing a substantial breach of a contract cannot maintain an action against the other contracting party for a subsequent failure to perform if
the promises are dependent. (Norrington v. Wright, 115
U. S. 188, 29 L. Ed. 366, 6 S. Ct. 12. (A. J. 12, Sec. 338,
Page 894.)
NEGLIGENT OR WILFUL CONDUCT.-One of
the interesting questions that have arisen is whether
negligent or wilful acts of the plaintiff are available as
a defense. It may be said that in an action to recover
damages for the breach of a contract, the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff ordinarily does not proclude
his recovery, as would be the case in an action of tort.
Such negligence rarely releases the defendant from the
obligation to perform his contract, but is always to be
considered in fixing the amount of the damages,-that
is, so much of the damages as is attributable to the plaintiff's negligence should be excluded from the recovery.
But although there is authority to the contrary, many
decisions have affirmed the rule that a wilful breach of
a stipulation in a contract bars recovery by the party
guilty of the breach. (A. J. 12, Sec. 339, Page 895.)
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APPROVAL OF PERFORMANCE
GENERALLY.-The question what consttiutes compliance with a contract which provides that the subject
matter thereof shall be satisfactory to the party who
promises to make compensation therefor presents two
distinct questions, one being whether the latter must act
in good faith in accepting or rejecting, and the other
being whether he must act reasonably. As to the first
there is ordinarily little difficulty. Such a contract does
not make the promisor's mere declaration of dissatisfaction conclusiYe. It requires an honest expression as to
whether he is satisfied. He should fairly and candidly
investigate and consider the matter, reach a genuine
conclusion, and express the true state of his mind. He
must not act arbitrarily or capriciously or merely feign
dissatisfaction. He cannot avail himself of his own fraud
to escape liability on his contract. It is only the actual
existence, not the mere expression of dissatisfaction,
regardless of its reasonableness, that can have this
effect. The opposite view seems, however, to be entertained by some courts. At least, the inference that the
promisor's good faith cannot be inquired into seems to
be justified by statements to the effect that in cases
where it is stipulated that an article to be furnished
shall unqualifiedly, be satisfactory to the party to whom
it is to be supplied, the right to reject the article, as not
being satisfactory, cannot be inquired into; but the
party's own determination must be taken as final and
conclusive. In such case it is supposed and such is the
construction, that the party has reserved to himself an
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unqualified option, and is not willing to leave his freedom of choice to any contention or to be subject to any
investigation whatever. It is said that if a promisor
thinks it is proper to enter into such a conditional contract, it is not for anyone other than the promisee himself to say that he ought to be satisfied; that is a matter
expressly reserved t ohim to decide for himself, and the
motive or reasons for the decision, whether reasonable
or unreasonable, good or bad, are placed by the contract
beyond question or investigation. (A. J. 12, Sec. 340,
Pages 340-341.)
There is no substantial compliance or performance
unless the work is sufficient for the purpose stated in
the contract or accomplishes such result. (Dawson vs.
:Myers, 26 Ohio Civ. Ct. N. S. 511, 9 C. J. Page 746,
Note 63.)
0"\vner cannot express dissatisfaction as a matter
of mere caprice. (Sec. 508, C. J. S., Page 1085.)
Strict and substantial performance. Substantial
performance means not doing the exact thing promised,
but doing something else that is just as good, or good
enough for both obligor and obligee. (U. S. Dorrance
vs. Barber & Co., C.C.A. N. Y. 262 F. 489.
There must have been an attempt in good faith to
perform. (State Bank of Monticello vs. Lauterbach, 268
N. W. 918.)
The non-performance of a material part of the contract will prevent the performance from amounting to
a substantial performance. (Same case as above.)
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Substantial performance is performance of all important particulars. (Tex-ThlrBermett Ys. Smith & McCallin, 9 C, J. P. 743, note 40(a) ).
POINT NO.5.
THE CO"CRT ERRED IN ENTERING IN ITS
FINDIXGS I~ NO.6 THEREOF THAT THE PLAINTIFF FRO~I THE CO~Il\IENCEMENT OF PERFOR~IANCE OF SAID AGREEThiENT TO THE TERMINATIOX THEREOF HAD PERFORMED BONA
FIDEDLY AXD IN REASONABLE AND COMPLETE
COXFORMANCE WITH THE TERMS OF SAID
AGREEMENT.
This finding of the court is so grossly unfounded
in and unsupported by the evidence in this case that it
hardly seems necessary to dwell at length in examining
its incongruities. Here we have a highly specialized
proposal to perform three distinct and clear-cut operations, to wit:
1. Four 20-ft. deep holes drilled and checked per
day.
2. Four 6-ft. deep holes stripped per day.
3. One ton of material drilled, shot and moved per
man per day.
Total cost for 60 days operation ________ $26,518.00
(See Exhibit "A")
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•
Time was of the essence of these obligations, for
the plaintiff knew at the time it executed the proposal
that the defendants required the information to be
gathered from such operations by April 15th, 1951 in
order to exercise their judgment on the option with
L. R. Weeks (Tr. 42) defendants stood to be obligated
to L. H. Weeks for $1,000.00 per month for twelve months
commencing April 15th, 1951, or execute the operating
agreement and lease which had then been executed by
defendants with said L. R. Weeks. As shown elsewhere
in this brief, 30 days had expired of the 60 day period
of the contract or proposal but the record discloses not
more than 10% of the above specified obligation had been
performed, yet the plaintiff submitted a claim for almost
half of the estimated cost of the entire undertaking.
How can the respondent claim under such a record of
performance that its undertaking had from the commencement of performance to the date of the termination
thereof been bona fidedly and in reasonable and complete
conformance with the terms of the proposal. :Manifestly
this finding is clearly error.
POINT NO.6.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ENTERING IN
ITS FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT
TO THE EFFECT THAT RESPONDENT FAILED,
NEGLECTED AND REFUSED TO PERFORM AND
CONFORM TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
THE RESPONDENT'S PROPOSAL (EXHIBIT "A")
AND THAT RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT OF ITS
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OPER ..:\TIONS UN"DER ITS SAID PROPOSAL EXHIBIT •·A'' 'V ~-\S SO INEFFICIENT AND INEFFECTIVE BY RE ..:\SON OF WORN AND BROI(EN
EQFIP"J[EXT AXD POOR ThL\NAGEMENT THAT
APPELL~-\XTS WERE OBLIGED TO TERMINArrE
S~-\ID AGREE"JIEXT AND TAI(E OVER THE OPERATIOXS THE:\ISELYES.
In support of Point X o. 6 the appellants respectively
refer to the authorities and argument presented under
Point Xo. -!. If appellants ha\ye any standing in this
Court on Point K o. 4, then it must follow that this point
is tenable. If appellants were entitled to substantial
performance of respondent's proposal, which of course
we most emphatically maintain under the terms of the
proposal and the law governing the rights and liabilities
of the parties, then it must follow as night the day, from
the evidence in this case, that the Court should have
entered a finding as set forth in this point, for if there
were ever a clean-cut demonstration of feeble effort to
perform in good faith the obligations of a contract it
is clear as crystal in this case. If appellants did not
commit a breach in refusing to honor and pay the bill
presented by the respondent it was because respondent
had been guilty of the first breach in failing, neglecting
and refusing to perform and conform as required by
its own proposal.
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OPTION TO TERMINATE CONTRACT FOR
UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE
When so provided by the contract, one party may
t.Prminate the contract in case performance by the other
is um~atisfactory. Such a provision is analogous to a
provision for performance by one party to the satisfaction of the other, considered in Sec. 495 infra. The
option to terminate the contract can only be exercised
in good faith. Where a party to a contract is given an
option to terminate a contract if dissatisfied, he may
exercise his option without any practical or utilitarian
reason where the right involved is one which is submitted to his taste or fancies, feelings, or judgment, but
when it is apparent that the question of satisfaction
relates to the commercial value or quality of the subject
matter of the contract, it must be shown that the dissatisfaction is reasonable and well founded. Dissatisfaction
under such a contract may be predicated on delay in
beginning performance as well as on matters occurring
during performance.
Where the contract provides that the work must
be done to the satisfaction of the owner, and gives him
a right to rescind if it is not done so, he cannot withhold
his satisfaction unreasonably, and arbitrarily rescind
the contract. An option given to the owner to discontinue
the contract if he should deem that it would prove unprofitable entitles him to the untrammeled exercise of
his judgment so long as he acts in good faith and with
reasonable basis for his belief. (17 C.J.S., Pages 890-1,
Sec. 399).
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'Yhere there is nothing to justify the contrary construction, the general rule in regard to contracts wherein
one party has the right to rescind if dissatisfied is that
the party to be satisfied is the judge of his own satisfaction, subjert only to the limitation that he must act
in good faith. (See Yan Denmark vs. California Home
Extension Ass 'n., 185 Par. 866, 43 Cal. App. 685.
(l{an. 1898) 'Yhere an agreement requires a daily
and continuous performance of the conditions of one
party, and when he performs such condition he is entitled
to the compensation at the end of each month, the performance of each stipulation is a condition precedent to
the continuing obligation of the contract.-(1896) (City
of Osawatomie v. Mills, 45 P. 937, 4 Kan. App. 299,
judgment reversed Mills v. City of Osawatomie, 53 P.
470, 59 Kan. 463.).
(Xev. 1919) A party who commits the first breach
of a contract cannot maintain an action against the other
for a subsequent failure to perform. (Bradley v. NevadaCalifornia-Oregon Ry., 178 P. 906, 42 Nev. 411.)
(Ore. 1921) One who would recover on a contract
must first show performance on his part. (Anderson v.
Wallowa Nat. Bank, 198 P. 560, 100 Ore. 679.)
(Wash. 1901) In an action on a special contract, the
plaintiff cannot recover without showing performance.
(Ingram v. Golden Tunnel Min. Co., 65 P. 549, 25 Wash.
318.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

MEMORANDUM-Gibbons & Reed vs. Guthrie, et al.
This memorandum is written with reference to the
business records of Gibbons and Reed, and introduced
in t~videnee at the trial.
Exhibit B pertains to what the plaintiff denominated
aH supervision and overhead expenses. Exhibit C is their
payroll journal. Exhibit 10 is their labor summary, and
Exhibit 3, a rental. Exhibits B and C were admitted at
page 108 of record. My notes do not now reflect the
point at which Exhibits 10 and 3 were admitted. I find .
no objections in the record to the introduction in evidence.
POINT NO.7.
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS EXHIBITS "B" AND "C", THE OPERATING LEDGER AND PAYROLL JOURNAL, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE RESPONDENT.
The plaintiff brought this suit to recover money
expended by it in the performance of a contract which
is characterized in plaintiff's pleadings, and in remarks
of counsel as an oral contract. At page 56 the plaintiff
introduced in evidence a written proposal made by it
to the defendants to do and perform certain types of
work on certain mining claims. The proposal which is
dated February 8, 1951, and which is Exhibit 9, was
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that the plaintiff would do and perform three things
or types of operations:
1. Drill the flat areas .
.-,

Ripping and stripping overburden.

3. Drifting into ore bodies.
The total cost for the performance of these three
items or types of operation was put by the plaintiff in
its proposal at $26,518. In view of the position taken
by plaintiff's counsel at the trial, it may be well to state
in negati\e terms the defendants' attitude or position
regarding his contract. The proposal was not that the
plaintiff would rent the defendants equipment or provide them with labor and carry the labor on plaintiff's
payroll, but that as stated in the proposal, which is the
only evidence in the record as to the terms of the contract, to do and perform within a 60-day period the three
operations set out by it in detail in its proposal of February 8, 1951, Exhibit 9. Whether the contract is,
strictly speaking, an oral or written contract is immaterial. The proposal, Exhibit 9, offered and introduced
by plaintiff, is the only evidence of the contract, and the
case was presented and tried to the trial court on the
premise that the proposal was in fact the contract between plaintiff and defendants.
In the light of the foregoing, the defendants now
address themselves to the question of proof of performance by the plaintiff, of the contract-for without proof
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of performance, or ability to perform, it is fundamental
that the plaintiff may not recover a judgment against
the defendants. The plaintiff introduced certain of its
n•<·onls and books of account in evidence. Counsel for
plaintiff and the trial court both appeared to have
:tHHUmed that the entries on the books of the plaintiff,
and on other of plaintiff's business records constitute
proof that the plaintiff performed the proposals set
forth by it in its proposal of February 8, 1951.
The law, however, is to the contrary. We admit that
hooks of account and business records are admissible
in evidence if a proper foundation is laid. The probative
value of such records is indeed another matter. The
books of account and the records introduced by the plaintiff were supported only by the testimony of plaintiff's
witness, Ed M. Shea, assistant secretary-treasurer of
the plaintiff corporation. :l\Ir. Shea did not testify as to
the performance of work by the plaintiff, but only that
he was in charge of the keeping of the records. His
knowledge, so far as the record is concerned, is confined
solely to the maintenance of records in the office of
plaintiff, and not as to the performance or non-performance of any work in compliance with the proposal, under
which the plaintiff offered to do the three matters above
specified for the defendants. Whether these records
were properly qualified for admission in evidence in the
absence of a showing by the witness that he had knowledge that the things and matters referred to in the
records were actually done and performed, is for hte
Court to determine. It is stated in Jones Commentaries
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on Evidence, Second Edition, Vol. 4, Page 3330, Par.
1801, as follows:
"TlH• courts haYP fn•qlWlltly C'Xprt'HHPd the
opinion that shop books are quite unsatiHfaetory
as evidence and should be suhjeeted to clost>
serutinv. It has been said that books of account
are rec.eivt•d only upon the presumption that no
other proof exists; that tlwy are the weakest and
most suspicious kind of evidence, and that admission of such matter is a violation of one of the
first principles of the law of evidence, which is
that a party shall not, himself, make evidence in
his own favor."
What is the plaintiff's evidence that within sixty
days from the time that the plaintiff undertook to carry
out the proposal it diligently prosecuted the drilling of
the flat areas, or the ripping or stripping of the overburden, or the drifting into ore bodies 1 There is no
evidence of due performance of the contract by the
plaintiff. On the other hand, the record is replete with
references to a D Cat, where it came from, the freight
involving transportation, whether it would or wouldn't
work, of airplane rides for which plaintiff appears to
have charged defendants $300 or $400, and which item
seems to be included in the judgment of plaintiff recovered in the trial court, even though the trial judge,
at page ______ , held that plaintiff could not recover this
item.
There is other evidence as to who was bossing the
job, but where is the evidence as to the amount of drilling done on flat areas, or the stripping off of the overSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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burden, or the drifting into ore bodies, which were the
things that the plaintiff contracted to do for defendarJs?
There is no evidence of this in the record and the lack
thereof cannot be overcome by the office records of
plaintiff.

POINT NO.8.
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT HEREIN, AND THE
WHOLE THEREOF, TO THE EFFECT THAT:
1. THAT THE PLAINTIFF BE AWARDED A
JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF $12,356.75 WITH
IN'rEREST THEREON AT THE RATE OF SIX PER
CENT (6%) FROM MARCH 18, 1951.
In support of this Point appellants are content to
refer to and request the Court to consider the argument
and authorities presented in this brief under points 1,
4, 5 and 6. If, however, this Court should determine
under the law and the evidence applicable to the case
at bar, that the respondent is entitled to some relief
it is the position of appellants under all the authority
that respondent is not entitled to the amount of the
judgment entered in this case, hut must be content to
rest its case on the principal of quantum meruit or the
reasonable value of the benefits which came to appellants by reason of the operation of respondent in its
effort to comply with its covenants under the proposal
(Exhibit "A"). Under this theory it was the duty of
the trial Court to make a finding clearly appraising
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and defining the value of the benefits conferred upon
the appellants arising out of the operations of the
respondent from the day respondent undertook to pPrform to the dny when appellants saw fit to terminate
:such operations.
POINT NO.9.
'rHE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING CONCLrSIO~ OF LAW NO.3 TO THE EFFECT
THAT:
THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
ANY RELIEF ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM AND
THAT THE SA:JIE SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITIIOUT PREJUDICE.
The appellants were entitled to terminate the operations of respondent for lack of diligence and for shawdy
performance. The proposal provided an option to appellants to take over any time they desired to do so,
but the law requires dissatisfaction with performance
to be founded in good reason and not caprice. We submit there was ample good reason for appellants to terminate respondent's operations and take charge themselves. If this be so, it follows that any damage sustained by appellants on account of respondent's failure
to perform should be recouped. If the law requires appellants to pay any part of the claim of respondent the
appellants should be entitled to recoup their damages
as set forth in their counterclaim, and the Court erred
in dismissing same. See 12 Am. Juris., Sec. 353.
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SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE OF
PERFORMANCE

( U tab, 1908) Though a building contractor may not
depart from the terms of a contract and recover as upon
a quantum meruit, a substantial compliance therewith
in good faith entitles the contractor to recover on the
eontract, with a right to the owner to recoup any damages sustained through the contractor's failure to literally comply with the contract. (Foulger v. McGrath, 95
P. 1004, 34 Utah 86.)
(Utah, 1921) Under a contract for the erection of a
building according to agreed plans and specifications,
the law contemplates a substantial, but not punctilious,
compliance therewith; the contractor not being permitted to profit by noncompliance with the contract, nor
the owner to reap the benefits of the added value to his
property by reason of labor performed and materials
furnished by the contractor. (Stephens v. Doxey, 198 P.
261, 58 Utah 196.)
CONCLUSION

On the basis of the points discussed herein, appellants submit that the judgment of the trial court awarding damages favor of respondent in the sum of $12,356.75,
with interest at 6% from March 18th, 1951, together with
costs, is in error and should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILES
Attorney for Appellants
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